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Abstract
The Supreme Court held in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion that a California law
declaring class arbitration waivers unconscionable was preempted because it stood as an
“obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives” of the Federal
Arbitration Act. The Court’s Concepcion decision was necessarily based on implied preemption,
because the FAA contains no express preemption clause and because there was no textual conflict
between the FAA and the California law. Concepcion illustrates two fundamental problems with
implied preemption: it violates federalism principles by permitting significant federal
encroachment on state laws, and it violates separation-of-powers principles by permitting the
Court to re-write federal statutes in accordance with the Court’s inferred (and arguable)
interpretation of statutory purpose. This article argues that the Court’s preemption analysis of the
FAA is wrong and that the FAA should preempt only textually inconsistent state laws.
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The Supreme Court’s recent 5-4 decision in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion 1
controversially held a California law that declared class arbitration waivers unconscionable was
preempted because it stood as an “obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives” 2 of § 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). 3 In doing so, the majority
engaged in a contentious debate with the dissenters over whether California’s Discover Bank 4
rule was consistent with the FAA’s primary objective and to what extent the FAA’s savings
clause in § 2 precluded California’s general policy against exculpatory contracts. Crucially,
however, the two sides disagreed over the FAA’s primary purpose and whether the nature of class
arbitration proceedings was fundamentally at odds with the appropriate definition of arbitration.
This disagreement and others like it involving doctrines of implied preemption can be
avoided by applying Professor Stephen Gardbaum’s new perspective on federal preemption. 5
Gardbaum argues that a fundamental misconception of preemption, that Congress’s power to
preempt flows from the Supremacy Clause, confuses the issue of whether concurrent state
authority has actually been displaced. 6 A proper understanding of the FAA’s effect on state
contract disputes therefore begins with framing Congress’s power to preempt. 7 This article
asserts that the modern dialectic over the FAA’s preemption power overly focuses on the
purposes and objectives of Congress in passing the Act, rather than the true issue of whether there
is actual conflict between state law and the FAA’s text. Adoption and incorporation of
Gardbaum’s preemption analysis provides a necessary guide to navigating the tricky waters left in
the wake of Concepcion.
A conversation regarding the nature of preemption and whether the FAA has preemptive
power is essential, as Concepcion demonstrates, because the Court has shown itself willing to
supersede state laws reflecting state public policy when those laws conflict with an inferred
purpose of the FAA , rather than with the actual text of the Act.8 Part I of this article provides an
accounting of the Concepcion case itself. It methodically considers the three opinions in the case
and the main arguments advanced by each. In Part II, the current doctrine of implied preemption
is analyzed and compared with the preemption theories of two legal commentators on the issue.
This section particularly focuses on the problems associated with the “categorical” approach to
preemption and the idea that the Court may infer the purpose of Congress to displace state
authority. Part III briefly examines several of the recent criticisms of Concepcion and the
suggested unavoidable consequences of the majority’s holding. Throughout the article we will
demonstrate that the entrenched thinking on FAA preemption of state law exists largely because
of misinterpretations of Congress’s preemption power and has resulted in harsh results for state
governments as well as for unsophisticated parties to arbitration agreements.

1

AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
Id. at 1753 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
3
9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). This section is commonly referred to as the FAA’s “savings clause,” which provides the
criteria for which arbitration agreements are not enforceable under the FAA.
4
Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005).
5
See Stephen Gardbaum, Congress’s Power to Preempt the States, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 39 (2006); Stephen A.
Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 767 (1994).
6
Stephen Gardbaum, Congress’s Power to Preempt the States, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 39, 41 (2006) (“Thus, although
both supremacy and preemption displace (or supersede) state law, they operate to displace different types of state law
and do so by the different mechanisms of automatic consequence and discretionary power respectively.”).
7
See id. at 40.
8
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753.
2
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I.

CONCEPCION

A. Background & Facts
Vincent and Liza Concepcion’s case started with an increasingly typical consumer
transaction. Responding to Cingular Wireless’ 9 advertisement offering a free cellular phone with
every new wireless contract, the Concepcions signed a two-year Wireless Service Agreement
(WSA) in February 2002. 10 The WSA contained both a clause requiring that all disputes arising
out of the agreement be submitted to arbitration, and a class action waiver that barred the
aggregation of similar claims. 11 After signing the contracts and receiving two new phones, the
Concepcions also received a bill for $30.22, a charge for sales tax on the phones. 12 Instead of
following the WSA’s procedure for claim dispute resolution, involving arbitration, the
Concepcions sued AT&T Mobility in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
California in March 2006. 13 The Concepcions alleged that AT&T had defrauded them as
consumers and had falsely advertised the phones as “free.” 14 The district court consolidated the
Concepcions’ claim in September 2006 with the Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC class action
involving the same types of advertisements and charges. 15
In December 2006, AT&T modified the arbitration clause of the WSA to include a
“premium payment clause,” which required AT&T to pay $7,500 to a claimant if an arbitrator
awarded the consumer an amount greater than AT&T’s largest settlement offer at the time of
arbitrator selection. 16 After the addition of this clause, AT&T filed its motion to compel
arbitration under the WSA’s revised terms. 17 The district court denied AT&T’s motion and,
applying the California Supreme Court’s holding in Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 18 held that
“California’s stated policy of favoring class litigation and arbitration to deter alleged fraudulent
conduct in cases involving large numbers of consumers with small amounts of damages, compels
the Court to invalidate [AT&T]'s class waiver provision.” 19
California’s Discover Bank test requires satisfying three prongs to determine the
unconscionability of a class action waiver in a consumer contract:

9
Although the Concepcions bought the contract from Cingular in 2002, the company was bought by AT&T in
2005 and renamed AT&T Mobility in 2007. Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849, 852 n.1 (2009).
10
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1744.
11
Laster, 584 F.3d at 852.
12
Id.
13
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1744.
14
Id.
15
Laster, 584 F.3d at 853.
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
Discover Bank, 113 P.3d at 1100.
19
Laster v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. 05cv1167 DMS (AJB), 2008 WL 5216255, at *14 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 11,
2008).
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(1) is the agreement a contract of adhesion; (2) are disputes
between the contracting parties likely to involve small amounts
of damages; and (3) is it alleged that the party with superior
bargaining power has carried out a scheme deliberately to cheat
large numbers of consumers out of individually small sums of
money. 20
The Ninth Circuit upheld the district court’s application of California law and also found
that the FAA did not expressly or impliedly preempt the Discover Bank rule. 21 According to the
Ninth Circuit, the FAA did not expressly preempt California law because the Discover Bank rule
applied equally to any contract clause that barred class aggregation of claims. 22 Therefore it did
not conflict with the FAA’s § 2 which states that arbitration clauses “shall be valid, irrevocable,
and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract.” 23 Additionally, the FAA did not impliedly preempt Discover Bank under a theory of
obstacle preemption because California’s law “placed arbitration agreements on the exact same
footing as contracts that bar class litigation outside the context of arbitration.” 24

B.

The Scalia Majority Opinion

Justice Scalia wrote for the Court. He began his analysis by discussing the purposes and
general policy of the FAA, foreshadowing a finding of implied preemption, 25 specifically the
variety referred to as obstacle preemption.26 The majority determined that California’s policy of
protecting consumers by barring class waivers from arbitration agreements obstructed Congress’s
purpose in enacting the FAA and was therefore preempted.27 Scalia’s argument for FAA
preemption rested on two main points: (1) that California’s “policy against exculpation” was not a
ground under the FAA’s § 2, that “exist[s] at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract,” 28 and (2) that Discover Bank was inconsistent with the FAA’s “’principal purpose’ to
ensure that private agreements are enforced according to their terms.” 29
In holding that the Discover Bank rule was not “a ground that ‘exist[s] at law or in equity
for the revocation of any contract’ under FAA § 2,” 30 Scalia engaged in a categorical evaluation
of whether a state policy against class waivers satisfied the textual requirements of the FAA’s
savings clause. 31 In the majority’s view, California’s policy of protecting consumers from class
waivers in adhesion contracts had a “disproportionate impact on arbitration agreements,” 32 and

20

Laster, 584 F.3d at 854.
Id. at 857-59.
22
Id. at 857.
23
Id. (citing 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006)).
24
Id. (emphasis in original).
25
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1745.
26
Gardbaum, supra note 5, at 62.
27
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753.
28
Id. at 1746.
29
Id. at 1748 (citing Volt Info. Scis. Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 489
(1989)).
30
Id. at 1746.
31
Id. at 1747.
32
Id.
21
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was therefore inconsistent with the Court’s previous holding in Perry v. Thomas. 33 In Perry, the
Court had held that states cannot “rely on the uniqueness of an agreement to arbitrate as a basis
for a state-law holding that enforcement would be unconscionable, for this would enable the court
to effect what . . . the state legislature cannot.”34 In other words, because the state policy in
Discover Bank applied only to consumer adhesion contracts, it did not apply “generally” to
contracts and in fact would disproportionately affect agreements where the parties had agreed to
settle their disputes through arbitration.35 Scalia also cited two law review articles in stating that
“California courts have been more likely to hold contracts to arbitrate unconscionable than other
contracts.” 36
The majority’s second conclusion, that Discover Bank is hostile to the “primary purpose”
of the FAA, exhibited a more functional analysis of what arbitration under the FAA was supposed
to look like. 37 In painting a picture of the kind of arbitration favored by the FAA, the majority
described arbitration as: “efficient, streamlined procedures tailored to the type of dispute,”
relatively informal, generally successful at “reducing the cost and increasing the speed of dispute
resolution,” and beneficial because “the costliness and delays of litigation . . . can be largely
eliminated . . ..” 38 This was crucially important because the Concepcion plaintiffs argued that
aggregation of arbitration claims, though inconsistent with the class waiver provision in the
arbitration agreement, were not inconsistent with the purpose of promoting arbitration. Given
this position, the majority opinion held that class arbitration proceedings were too dissimilar to
the kind of arbitration contemplated by the FAA to be consistent with its “primary purpose.” 39
The majority determined that “class arbitration, to the extent it is manufactured by Discover Bank
rather than consensual, is inconsistent with the FAA.” 40 This rationale takes issue with the form
of arbitration sought by the plaintiffs and its fundamental inconsistency with traditional bilateral
arbitration.
In our view, the second conclusion is more critical to the majority’s opinion than the first
because it strikes at the heart of obstacle preemption: frustration of purpose. The majority
33

Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987).
Id. at 493 n.9.
35
This inference supposes that the majority of consumer contracts include a mandatory arbitration clause for
handling all disputes under the contract. Because nearly all consumer contracts are now contracts of adhesion, the
effect of the rule then applies primarily to consumer contracts. The majority particularly found troubling the fact that
the Discover Bank test’s requirements that damages be predictably small and a scheme to cheat consumers be alleged.
In its view, the majority considered these factors “toothless and malleable” and contrary to the FAA’s purpose in
favoring arbitration by only requiring mere allegation to invalidate an arbitration agreement. See Concepcion, 131 S.
Ct. at 1750.
36
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1747 (citing Stephen A. Broome, An Unconscionable Application of the
Unconscionability Doctrine: How the California Courts are Circumventing the Federal Arbitration Act, 3 HASTINGS
BUS. L.J. 39, 54, 66 (2006); and Susan Randall, Judicial Attitudes Toward Arbitration and the Resurgence of the
Unconscionability Doctrine, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 185, 186-87 (2004)).
37
See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1748-53.
38
Id. at 1749 (citing 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 269 (2009); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985); and Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985)).
39
Id. at 1750.
40
Id. at 1751; see also id. at 1750 ( “[T]he ‘changes brought about by the shift from bilateral arbitration to classaction arbitration’ are ‘fundamental.’”) (quoting Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1776
(2010)); and Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1750 (“Classwide arbitration includes absent parties, necessitating additional
and different procedures and involving higher stakes. Confidentiality becomes more difficult. And . . . arbitrators are
not generally knowledgeable in the often-dominant procedural aspects of certification, such as the protection of absent
parties.”).
34
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concludes that class arbitration procedures cannot be as efficient as the bilateral procedures
contemplated by the FAA. 41 In his view, Justice Scalia considered class arbitration incapable of
producing “efficient, streamlined” results for parties agreeing to arbitrate their disputes. 42 The
majority states, contrary to the dissent’s view, that the primary purpose of the FAA is the
“expeditious resolution of claims” through an informal, low-cost proceeding. 43 Additionally,
arbitrators by and large are simply incapable of understanding the “often-dominant” procedural
demands of class certification. 44 As will be discussed later, these arguments for arbitration in
Concepcion are eerily similar to the types of arguments initially launched against arbitration
when the FAA was enacted. Yet, the majority finds that the essence of arbitration in the FAA is
incompatible with the modern procedural form of class actions, which is “slower, more costly,
and more likely to generate procedural morass than final judgment.” 45
The Court’s holding in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp.46 is vital in this
respect because it determined that the class form of arbitration is so incompatible with the
fundamental purpose of arbitration that where arbitration agreements are silent as to the
availability of class procedure for dispute resolution, it cannot be found impliedly available. 47
Stolt-Nielsen makes the logic of the Concepcion majority clear: if class arbitration is not
impliedly available absent a class waiver, then finding an arbitration agreement’s class waiver
unconscionable and void under state law cannot make claim aggregation any more available than
where the waiver was absent. The Concepcion plaintiffs, however, raised the obvious argument
that because parties to an arbitration agreement could provide for the possibility of aggregated
claims in their agreement, class arbitration cannot be incompatible with the purpose of FAA
arbitration. 48 Yet Scalia, in stating that “[a]rbitration is a matter of contract, and the FAA
requires courts to honor parties’ expectations,” 49 dismisses this argument because presumably
parties cannot reasonably expect the availability of class arbitration where the contract does not
so provide. 50
The majority opinion closes by addressing the functional effect issues raised by the
Concepcion plaintiffs, specifically that companies that include class waiver provisions in their
arbitration agreements will effectively immunize themselves from fraud claims. 51 Citing the
Ninth Circuit’s findings, the majority stated that the “Concepcions were better off under their
arbitration agreement with AT&T than they would have been as participants in a class action”
because of the premium payment clause in the revised contract.52 Therefore, because submitting
disputes to arbitration under the agreement would result in the vastly improved position of the
consumer, it was immaterial whether most aggrieved consumers would consider the claim too

41

Id. at 1750-51.
Id. at 1749-51.
43
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1749.
44
Id. at 1750.
45
Id. at 1751. “Indeed, class arbitration was not even envisioned by Congress when it passed the FAA in 1925;
as the California Supreme Court admitted in Discover Bank, class arbitration is a ‘relatively recent development.’” Id.
(quoting Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1110 (Cal. 2005)).
46
Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010).
47
Id. at 1775.
48
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1752.
49
Id. (citing Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2777 (2010)).
50
See id.
51
Id. at 1753.
52
Id. (quoting Laster, 2008 WL 5216255, at *12).
42
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insignificant to contest or too burdensome. In other words, despite the Ninth Circuit’s
consideration that California had a valid (and non-preempted) interest in deterring consumer
fraud through the class waiver ban, the majority found the interest insufficient to meet the FAA §
2 standard of “a ground that ‘exist[s] at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.’” 53

C. The Thomas Concurrence
Justice Thomas reiterated his traditional opposition to the Court’s use of the implied
preemption doctrine, but concurred with the majority because he believed Discover Bank did not
provide a “ground for the revocation of any contract” as textually required by FAA § 2. 54 His
concurrence analyzed the textual requirements of the FAA and the ability of the Discover Bank
rule to provide a reason compatible with the FAA for the class waiver ban. Because the text of §
2 refers to “grounds . . . for revocation,” it necessarily meant that only those grounds related to
the making of the contract were sufficient to activate the savings provision of the FAA. 55
The Discover Bank rule provides for the nonenforcement of an arbitration clause, rather
than the revocation of the contract as required by FAA § 2. 56 In Thomas’ view, the California
rule, therefore, did not satisfy the savings clause provision of the FAA and was invalid. 57 To
Thomas, the Ninth Circuit’s characterization of AT&T’s arbitration clause as “exculpatory” was
fatal because “[e]xculpatory contracts are a paradigmatic example of contracts that will not be
enforced because of public policy . . . Refusal to enforce a contract for public policy reasons does
not concern whether the contract was properly made.” 58 Therefore, because the nonenforcement
of the class waiver did not need to consider whether the contract was properly formed, it was not
a ground sufficient for the savings clause and was preempted. 59

D. The Breyer Dissent
The Concepcion dissent was written by Justice Breyer and joined by Justices Ginsburg,
Sotomayor, and Kagan. 60 Breyer followed the organization of the majority opinion and argued
that: (1) the Discover Bank rule satisfies the requirements of the FAA’s savings clause in § 2,

53

Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1746 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006)).
Id. at 1753 (Thomas, J., concurring) (emphasis added) (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006)); Justice Thomas has
repeatedly stated his opposition to implied preemption, objecting to where “the Court routinely invalidates state laws
based on perceived conflicts with broad federal policy objectives, legislative history, or generalized notions of
congressional purposes that are not embodied within the text of federal law,” Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 583
(2009) (Thomas, J., concurring); see also Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 459 (2005) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (“[I am] increasing[ly] reluctan[t] to expand federal statutes beyond their terms through doctrines of
implied pre-emption.”).
55
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1754-55 (Thomas, J., concurring).
56
Id. at 1756.
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1756 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
60
Id.
54
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merely placing arbitration clauses on the same or equal footing as other contract clauses;61 and (2)
the Discover Bank rule is consistent with the purpose behind the FAA because class arbitration is
not opposed to the fundamental attributes of arbitration. 62 Accordingly, the dissent argued that
the ban on class waivers applied broadly enough to all contracts that it satisfied the savings clause
and that class arbitration’s form was not fundamentally adverse to the purpose of the FAA. 63
The dissent premised its argument for qualification under the savings clause on the notion
that the Discover Bank rule was nothing more than an “authoritative state-court interpretation” of
that state’s general unconscionability law.64 California Civil Code already declared exculpatory
contracts or clauses illegal, and authorized expansion of the unconscionability doctrine to such
terms. 65 Therefore, consumer adhesion contracts that effectively exculpated companies like
AT&T through class waivers violated the pre-existing California unconscionability doctrine. To
the dissent, the Discover Bank rule did little more than determine that certain contracts that met
the three-prong requirement were as exculpatory as other contracts that limited liability under
California law. 66 Indeed, not all class action waivers were unconscionable under California law,
only ones which satisfied the qualities of an exculpatory contract or term. 67 Breyer reasoned the
that application of California’s unconscionability doctrine under these circumstances, whether in
an arbitration agreement or an agreement subject to litigation, placed class waivers “upon the
same footing as other contracts.” 68
In response to Scalia’s condemnation of class arbitration as a process fundamentally
different from bilateral arbitration because of its form, the dissent urged that the FAA was not
enacted to secure substantive rights to any particular procedural advantages.69 Rather, the FAA
was passed so that arbitration, when freely chosen by the contracting parties as a venue for
remedy, would be honored by the courts. 70 To the dissent, class arbitration itself would not be
adverse to the primary purpose or primary objective of the FAA unless it discouraged the
enforcement of arbitration agreements. 71 Therefore the primary objective of the FAA was
enforcement of arbitration clauses and not, as the majority indicated, protecting a particular form
of arbitration that guaranteed low costs to parties or expedient claim resolution.72

61
Id. at 1760 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also id. (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Because California applies the same
legal principles to address the unconscionability of class arbitration waivers as it does to address the unconscionability
of any other contractual provision, the merits of class proceedings should not factor into our decision.”); and id. at 1758
(“[U]nlike the majority’s examples, the Discover Bank rule imposes equivalent limitations on litigation . . . .”).
62
Id. at 1759 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1743 n.9) (“Where does the majority get its
contrary idea--that individual, rather than class, arbitration is a ‘fundamental attribut[e]’ of arbitration? The majority
does not explain. And it is unlikely to be able to trace its present view to the history of the arbitration statute itself.”).
63
Id.
64
Id. at 1756.
65
Id. (citing CAL. CIV. CODE §§1668, 1670.5(a) (West 1985)).
66
See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1757 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
67
Id. (“Courts applying California law have enforced class action waivers where they satisfy general
unconscionability standards.”) (emphasis added).
68
Id. (quoting Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 511 (1974)).
69
Id. at 1758.
70
Id.
71
See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1758 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“But we have also cautioned against thinking that
Congress’ primary objective was to guarantee these particular procedural advantages. Rather, that primary objective
was to secure the ‘enforcement’ of agreements to arbitrate.”) (citing Dean Witter Reynolds Inc., 470 U.S. at 221).
72
Id.
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To counter the litany of difficulties associated with class procedure as outlined by the
majority, Breyer referenced several sources approving of class arbitration and declared the
procedure “consistent with the use of arbitration.” 73 Prominently, the dissent cited the American
Arbitration Association’s (AAA) amicus brief from Stolt-Nielsen, which described class
arbitration as “a fair, balanced, and efficient means of resolving class disputes.”74 The AAA also
favorably described the benefits of class arbitration, stating that class arbitration reduced the
average time for dispute resolution over court-based class actions. 75 Therefore, even if the FAA
was enacted for the specific purpose of expediting claims in a low-cost, efficient, and fair
resolution process, class arbitration was not inconsistent with any of those attributes. 76
The dissent concluded by stating that the Court has previously considered the dynamic
nature of arbitration proceedings and the varied forms they might take, demonstrating the illogic
of the majority’s restriction of arbitration to a particular form. 77 Absent a state law that
“disfavors arbitration,” the dissent stated that California’s law was not preempted and that states
should be able to apply their own doctrines of unconscionability consistent with that restriction.78

II.

FAA P R E E M P T I O N & A N A L Y S I S

As the holding in Concepcion rests on the majority’s finding that the FAA preempts
California law, it is vital to consider the source of the FAA’s preemption and the context in which
state law is supplanted by the operation of the federal statute. Since the Supreme Court’s
decision in Southland Corp. v. Keating, 79 the Court has interpreted § 2 of the FAA as preempting
state laws that single out arbitration for disfavored treatment.80 As the Court has stated in the
past, however, the FAA contains no express preemption provision. 81 Therefore, a preemption
finding is dependent upon an implication of Congress’s intent to displace state authority. In
Concepcion, the majority held that the Discover Bank rule was preempted “because it ‘stands as

73

Id.
Id. (quoting Brief for American Arbitration Association as Amicus Curiae at 25, Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v.
AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010) (No. 08-1198)).
75
Id. at 1759 (quoting Brief for American Arbitration Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party at
24, Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010) (No. 08-1198), 2009 WL 2896309); see also
id. at 1759-60 (“Data from California courts confirm that class arbitrations can take considerably less time than in-court
proceedings in which class certification is sought . . . And a single class proceeding is surely more efficient than
thousands of separate proceedings for identical claims. Thus, if speedy resolution were all that mattered, the Discover
Bank rule would reinforce, not obstruct that objective of the Act.”).
76
See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1758 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The dissent specifically rejected the idea that the
FAA’s “primary purpose” was to provide a simplified and expedient claim resolution process, citing Dean Witter: “we
‘reject the suggestion that the overriding goal of the Arbitration Act was to promote the expeditious resolution of
claims.’” Dean Witter, 470 U.S. at 219.
77
Id. at 1761 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“We have reached results that authorize complex arbitration procedures . . .
We have upheld nondiscriminatory state laws that slow down arbitration proceedings . . . But we have not, to my
knowledge, applied the Act to strike down a state statute that treats arbitrations on par with judicial and administrative
proceedings.”).
78
Id. at 1760.
79
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
80
Richard A. Bales, Contract Formation Issues in Employment Arbitration, 44 BRANDEIS L.J. 415, 422 (2006).
81
Volt Info. Scis., Inc., v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 477 (1989) (“The FAA
contains no express pre-emptive provision, nor does it reflect a general congressional intent to occupy the entire field of
arbitration.”).
74
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an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress.’” 82 This section examines (1) the source of Congress’s preemption power, and (2) the
doctrine of implied “obstacle” preemption and the problems associated with implied FAA
preemption.

A. The Source of Congress’s Power to Preempt
It is widely agreed that the “pre-emption doctrine is derived” from the Supremacy
Clause, and “any state law, however clearly within a State’s acknowledged power, which
interferes with or is contrary to federal law, must yield.”84 Further, to determine “whether the
Congress ha[s] precluded state enforcement of select state laws adopted pursuant to its authority .
. . [t]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone.” 85 These two often quoted pillars of
federal preemption doctrine continue to guide the Court’s reasoning in FAA cases dating back to
Southland. 86
However, acceptance of these maxims is not universal and some legal theorists, including
Professor Stephen Gardbaum and Professor Caleb Nelson, compellingly contend that federal
preemption doctrine incorrectly locates the source of Congress’s preemption power in the
Supremacy Clause. 87 Their alternative view posits that the Supremacy Clause operates
automatically to determine whether state law or federal law should govern where the two sources
of power are contradictory. 88 Preemption, on the other hand, occurs when Congress affirmatively
deprives states of their authority to act, even where state law does not contradict the federal law at
all. 89 This view challenges the accepted doctrine of implied preemption that state law is
displaced when it merely obstructs the purposes of Congress.90 As the Court in Concepcion
expanded the interpretation of the FAA to preclude a particular form of arbitration, revisiting
FAA preemption is warranted to comprehend to what extent state law is valid before it conflicts
with the FAA’s “principal purpose.”
Under Gardbaum and Nelson’s alternative approach, state law is naturally displaced, or
“trumped,” under the Supremacy Clause by a federal statute “[w]hen a court must choose
between applying a valid rule of federal law and applying some aspect of state law.” 91 This
distinction is important to the application of the doctrine of implied preemption because it
categorizes “supremacy” as the effect which occurs when compliance with both laws as written is
83
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impossible. 92 If the Supremacy Clause does not provide Congress with an affirmative power, but
instead acts as a “tiebreaker” for courts in determining which law should govern a particular
matter, then the Supremacy Clause cannot be the source of power for implied preemption. 93
Because obstacle preemption is a particular variety of the implied preemption doctrine,
determining whether supremacy or preemption is involved has specific importance to
Concepcion.
This does not mean, however, that preemption is unauthorized by the Constitution. To
the contrary, Professor Gardbaum describes preemption as a valid exercise of Congress’s power
under the Necessary and Proper Clause 94 to displace state authority. 95 According to Gardbaum
“the most compelling argument in favor of a congressional power of preemption is a practical one
– the need for uniform national regulation, for one set of rules in particular areas.”96 The
Necessary and Proper Clause enables Congress to effectuate its enumerated powers under the
Constitution, and most frequently under the Commerce Clause.97 This is consistent with the
Court’s statement of federal preemption in Retail Clerks Int’l Ass’n, Local 1625 v.
Schermerhorn, 98 although missing the step of the Necessary and Proper Clause’s operation,
stating that “Congress under the Commerce Clause may displace state power.”99
Yet, Gardbaum contends that Congress is limited to an extent in using its power to
preempt. 100 Because preemption involves the operation of one of Congress’s enumerated powers,
incorporating the power under the Necessary and Proper Clause, it is a discretionary power which
may only be invoked expressly. 101 Thus, it is predictable that Gardbaum concludes: “[a]s a
matter of constitutional law, there should be no such thing as implied preemption.”102

B.

Implied Preemption

The doctrine of implied preemption features most prominently in Concepcion in the
majority’s consideration of the “principal purpose” of the FAA. 103 Arriving at the conclusion that
the FAA’s purpose is to “ensur[e] that private arbitration agreements are enforced according to
92
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their terms,” 104 Scalia next states that “[t]he point of affording parties discretion in designing
arbitration processes is to allow for efficient, streamlined procedures tailored to the type of
dispute.” 105 The majority opinion then adopts the view that arbitration, as Congress intended
when it enacted the FAA, required certain procedural and functional qualities with which class
arbitration would be inconsistent.106 This purpose was inferred by the Court, and consistent with
its prior holding in Stolt-Nielsen. 107 Because Congress had not stated its intent to preempt state
law, both the primary purpose of the FAA and Congress’s intent to preempt state authority were
implied. By restricting the form that arbitration may take outside of the specific intent of the
contracting parties, the Court expanded the preemptive power to exclude more state law than
previously considered.
Many critics of FAA preemption point to the Court’s decision in Southland as the crucial
moment where the FAA’s § 2 was first considered preemptive “substantive law,” rather than
procedural law that did not bind state courts.108 In Southland, the majority concluded that ‘[i]n
enacting [Section] 2 of the federal Act, Congress declared a national policy favoring arbitration
and withdrew the power of the states to require a judicial forum for the resolution of claims which
the contracting parties had agreed to resolve by arbitration.” 109 Justice O’Connor notably
dissented in that case and argued that the FAA declared federal procedural law, which applied
only in federal courts, not state courts.110 This view has been echoed most recently by Justice
Thomas who continues to argue that the FAA applies only in federal courts.111
This conflicting interpretive view of the FAA’s purpose is the critical juncture where the
alternative view mentioned in the previous section might be instructive. Southland must be based
upon implied preemption because the FAA “contains no express pre-emption provision.” 112
There is no indication that the FAA is necessarily incompatible with state arbitration laws, at least
to the extent that the state laws do not ban arbitration clauses outright. Supremacy, under
Gardbaum’s alternative view, therefore is not at issue.113 Determining whether the FAA trumps
state law under the Supremacy Clause is a matter of statutory construction, similar to the
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procedure required for evaluating “whether one statute repeals another.” 114 Because the
alternative view eliminates the doctrine of implied preemption, O’Connor’s view that the FAA
applies only in federal courts is vindicated.
Although this discussion may seem trivial considering the Court’s devotion to the present
“categorical” approach to preemption 115 and wide adoption of the doctrine of implied
preemption, 116 the distinction between preemption and supremacy is helpful for halting an
expansive doctrine of preemption evidenced in Concepcion. As FAA obstacle preemption is
based on a state law’s conflict with Congress’s purposes, an ever-narrowing construction of the
kind of procedures the Court infers to be permitted under the FAA necessarily expands the FAA’s
preemptive effect. For instance, prior to Stolt-Nielsen (and to a certain extent Green Tree Fin.
Corp. v. Bazzle 117) the Court had not held that class arbitration was inconsistent with the concept
of arbitration advanced in the FAA. To the extent that the Court had not yet considered whether
the availability of class arbitration was inconsistent with the FAA, California’s state law was, at
that point, not preempted.
This of course highlights the fundamental problem with implied preemption: it is subject
to change depending upon the interpretation of Congress’s “purpose” by the Court’s majority. As
Justice O’Connor stated in Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson: “over the past decade, the
Court has abandoned all pretense of ascertaining congressional intent with respect to the Federal
Arbitration Act, building instead, case by case, an edifice of its own creation.”118 In the 59 years
prior to Southland, the Supreme Court had never held that the FAA even applied in state
courts. 119 A more predictable standard of preemption advocated by the alternative view above,
where Congress’s intent to displace state authority must be expressly stated, provides greater
clarity for delineating the balance between state and federal law. 120
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III.

WHAT CONCEPCION MEANS FOR THE CLASS-ACTION

Although the alternative view proposed in Section II would greatly improve clarity of
judicial preemption doctrine, the Court’s adherence to the current “categorical” approach
combined with the resignation of previous dissenters to stare decisis121 makes it unlikely that any
real change is on the horizon. However, substantial questions remain regarding the effect the
majority opinion in Concepcion will have on class actions and consumer agreements. Several
commentators have suggested that Concepcion sounded the death knell of class actions. 122 This
section considers the various concerns raised by those commentators.
In 2000, Professor Jean Sternlight wrote an article in the William & Mary Law Review
that prophesied the coming of Concepcion. 123 She noted that companies would use arbitration
clauses as vehicles to immunize themselves from class action lawsuits.124 She referred to an
arbitration clause packaged with a class waiver as a “Trojan horse.” 125 Additionally, Professor
Sternlight observed that companies would issue mandatory class waiver provisions after the filing
of class actions and would be successful. 126 The similarities between her predicted worst case
scenario for consumers and the actual case of Concepcion is striking, as nearly all came to pass.
Sternlight, however, was incorrectly optimistic that courts would come around to reject class
waivers from arbitration clauses as unconscionable under state law. 127
Professor Brian Fitzpatrick believes that Concepcion will likely lead to the end of class
actions against businesses altogether, not just consumer class actions.128 He predicates this theory
on the Supreme Court’s decisions limiting the certification of tort class actions beginning in the
1990s. 129 In his opinion, potential class litigants now come primarily from individuals involved
in a contractual business relationship, and where businesses have been given the green light to
immunize themselves through class waivers in adhesion contracts, the result will greatly reduce
the availability of class proceedings. 130 Correctly, Fitzpatrick points to the remaining solution to
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the plight of the class action: federal intervention.131 As the Court in Concepcion further limited
the extent to which state law might survive obstacle preemption, only a contrary federal law or
amendment to the FAA can return FAA jurisprudence to its rightful, presumably pre-Southland,
place.
Professor David Schwartz agrees with Professor Sternlight, stating that “it has been an
open secret for over a decade that a major motivation, perhaps the dominant motivation for the
imposition of arbitration clauses in adhesion contracts has been the hope that these clauses would
blossom into class action waivers.” 132 Further, he argues that the Supreme Court has permitted,
even manipulated, the FAA to become a functional, “do-it-yourself tort reform.” 133 Arbitration
agreements therefore have become supercontracts134 that defy the Court’s ruling in Prima Paint
Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg., 135 that the FAA “make[s] arbitration agreements as enforceable
as other contracts, but not more so.” 136
These commentators all recite a similar litany: that the Concepcion Court, by expanding
the preemption doctrine to preclude state policies against exculpatory agreements through class
waivers in adhesion contracts, authorized the death of the class action. Of course, the extent to
which this statement is true depends upon several factors, such as whether Congress chooses to
enact arbitration reform legislation, whether the membership of the Court changes to weigh in
favor of those justices who dissented in Concepcion, and whether businesses themselves
recognize the utility of class action litigation. Only time will tell, but for the short term it seems
that the Court has certainly foreclosed most of the conceivable challenges states might bring
against FAA preemption.

IV.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court in Concepcion expanded its application of obstacle preemption to
preclude states from enforcing public policies against unconscionable adhesion contracts.137 In
doing so, it carried on the logical conclusion from its holding in Stolt-Nielsen, that class
arbitration is fundamentally opposed to the purposes of bilateral arbitration and the FAA. 138
However, even if the FAA’s “principal purpose” as described by Scalia, “is to ‘ensur[e] that
private arbitration agreements are enforced according to their terms,’”139 the FAA cannot be taken
to mean that private agreements to arbitrate should be enforced in spite of their unconscionable
terms. Surely the FAA stands for a fundamental agreement to contract, based on the consent and
intent of both contracting parties. 140 Presuming this to be true, it is even more difficult to believe
that the Court can find the freedom of contract embodied in agreements where the parties cannot
131
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be shown to have entered freely. 141 “[I]t would be an odd conception of contractual liberty if a
law were taken to restrict freedom of contract simply because it interfered with the parties’
agreement as written.” 142
Despite concern over the practical effects of Concepcion and the very real threat to the
availability of class actions, the primary issue focused on in this article is the Court’s decision to
permit an expansive interpretation of the purposes of Congress in enacting particular legislation.
Obstacle preemption should be abandoned by the Court as a doctrine and substituted with the
simplified approach to preemption proposed by Professor Gardbaum. 143 Doing so will certainly
place a greater onus on Congress to be clear in asserting its power to displace state power, but this
is not inconsistent with the Court’s previous holdings on Congress’s abrogation of sovereign
immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.
Additionally, the Court’s view that arbitration under the FAA is restricted to a particular
form is not only absent from the text of the FAA, it is reminiscent of the prejudices and attitudes
towards arbitration that precipitated its enactment. The Court’s “essentialism,” as termed by
Professor Hiro Aragaki, is outmoded considering the modern capabilities and experience of
arbitrators to handle aggregated claims. 144 Additionally, the Court’s conclusion that banning
class waiver provisions will disfavor arbitration because parties will be less inclined to enter into
arbitration agreements merely guarantees that the “most loyal patrons” are favored over the
“institution of arbitration.” 145
As Justice O’Connor stated in her Allied-Bruce concurrence, the “edifice” of the Court’s
FAA preemption caselaw has been largely of its own construction. 146 The fear is that this
construction has become too impenetrable and that there is no way back through the woods in
which the Court has led us. The Court’s holding in Concepcion stands as a bleak indication that a
state policy interest in protecting unsophisticated parties with little or no real bargaining power is
an interest the Court believes is subservient to the rigid religion of the FAA.
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